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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ROChJ·:T l\1INI~G CO~PORA
TIO~. a Utah corporat10n, and

PJUNEEH CAIUSSA GOLD

~lINES, I>.'C. a \\'yoming
c1lrpnrat ion,

Pf11/11tiffs o)l(f Respo11dcnts,
\"S.

Case No.

10467

HL;LAl\ .J. (;ILL and
.~~GELO ~I.

BILLIS,

!Jcf( 11ilu11fs 011d A.ppcllonts.

EEPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
REPLY TO PETITIONERS' PRELIMIARY
STATE~IENT AND
ST.\ TE~IENTS OF FACTS
The dt>tai Jt.d statemPnt of facts contained m

JJla111tiffs-n·sp1l1Hlents brief at page 4 is comprehensi1e and \\·here 1w~·(·ssary reference will be made to
thi:; ::;tatL·111l·nt of facts rather than to restate the
;:i:tm1· in this brit•f. The plaintiff, after both sides
had ern11pklt'd their discm·ery, mm·ed for summary
J11drznH·nt and the trial court granted this motion
' ~ ,11 r1n1· tal\st> of action. The defendants appealed
fr,, ·1 rh(· .l!rnnt ing of this judgment. The facts pre~(·11t1·rl t() th(• court \\'Pre agreed facts and there
1
' ' fr nu issu1•:; 1d' fact h'ft to be tried as to this cause
uf act1ll11. Tlw undisputt>d facts were as follows:
1

1. The defendants we1·e the owners of 90'
of the stock of Rocket Mining Corporation '"h. 1
' n lC I
stock they received in consideration for transfo_
ing mining claims to the corporation. These sa 111 ,
claims they later caused the corporation to abandoi1.

2. In order to obtain approval from the Sec:un
ties and Exchange Commission of the United Statei
and from the Securities Department of the State
of Utah to sell stock to the public the defendants
executed an agreement in connection with their
registration statement and issued a prospectus in
which they covenanted that they would serve the
company without salary until the company's mining
operations "are on a paying basis". (See, pages ~
and 5 of Plaintiff-Respondents' Answering Brief.)
3. The sale of the public stock was approved
based on the promises and representations contained
in the registration statement and offering circular
to the effect that. the defendants would not dra',r
salaries until the company's properties were on a
paying basis. The defendants then caused 3,000,0011
shares of the common stock of the corporation to bt
sold to the public.
4. The defendants then voted salaries to themselves at a meeting where no quorum of clirectci·s
was present and accrued these salaries notwirhstanding the fact that the corporation had no ;,,
come at all from any of its operations. (See, Pla 111 tiff-Respondents' Answering Brief, pages 7 aild ~ 11
2

5. The defendants then sold the company propet'ties without corporate authority and paid themselves the accrued salaries from the proceeds of the
sale. (See, Plaintiff-Appellants' Answering Brief,
pages 7 and 8.)
The trial court correctly ruled that this was an
nnproper payment of corporate funds to the defendant directors and this court on appeal from that
judgment affirmed the trial court's ruling.
POINT I.
THE RULING AND OPINION OF THE COURT IS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECIDED CASES. THE
O~LY CASE CITED AGAINST THE OPINION OF THIS
COURT IS STRONG AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF
THE COURT'S OPINION.

The defendant appellants complained that the
granting of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the affirmation of that ruling by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah violates their
constitutional right to a trial on the issues determined by this judgment.
The propriety of the granting of summary judgments where there is no issue of fact is so well
settled that no authorities need be cited in support
thereof. Petitioner cites the case of Fountain v.
Filson, 336 U.S. 681, 69 S. Ct. 745, 93 L. Ed. 971
(rn39) as authority for the proposition that the
opinion of this court is against the law. This case is
authority for no such proposition and actually is
strong authority in support of the court's opinion.
3

In the Fountain case the District Court for the]_)·II
~1·ict of Columbia granted a motion for summaiv
Judgment in favm· of the defendant in a suit b:.
the plaintiff to establish a i·esulting t1·ust. The soil
basis of the motion for summary judgment was that
the New Jersey law would not permit imposition
of a resulting trust under the pleading in the corn.
plaint. The complaint proceeded on a theory of resulting trust and in addition, plead an altemafoe
cause of action. The defendant's motion for surn
mary judgment was directed solely against the nsulting trust cause of action. The District Court
granted the motion for summai·y judgment in fa\w
of the defendant. On appeal the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia did three things: (1)
The court agreed with the ti·ial court t!:at nu resulting trust could arise unde1· New J e1·s2y l~m.
( 2) The court stated that the g1·anting of summary
judgment was erroneous because the complaint alleged an alternative them·y of i·eco\rery which, if
proved, would allow the plain tiff to preYail indt·
pendently of the theory of a resulting trust. (:3) Tbr
Court of Appeals examined the depositions and con
eluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recon'r OI'
the alternci.tive theory which we.is not even befor
the conrt 0~1 appeal and gl'anted jucl~·rnent for tlw
plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Comt of t!w
United States the Supreme Coul't pointed out tlwt
the only issue before the trial court, and hence t;'e
only issue befm·e the Court of Appeals, \\."at:i whetlier

not the New Jersey law precluded the plaintiff
recorering on the theory of a resulting trust. The
~upreine Court furthe1· held that the Court of Appe:.1i:~ had no right to i·each beyond the issues raised
lw the appeal from the trial court and grant judg11;ent tu tht> plaintiff on the alternative cause because the plaintiff had not sought summary judgment on the alte1·native cause of action before the
trial comt. The Sum·eme Court, therefore, remanded
the case for fmthe1· trial on the alternative theory
of rccm'ery and vacated the judgment granted the
plaintiff b.v the Com·t of Appeals. In so doing, the
Supreme Court made is perfectly clear that it was
not disapproving of the summary judgment entered
by the Trial Comt but stated that the defendant
was entitled to meet the issues raised by the alternati,·e cause of action and since this had never been
bmg-ht hefoi·e the trial comt, the appellate court
lrncl no right to i·each beyond the issues raised by
tllP ai;pe(l ~ ~rncl gnmt judgment to the plaintiff on
the altrrnatin cause of action. In so doing the court
8pnrorecl 1if Ru1e ;)6 where the issues are before the
"OU''t and thei·e is no dispute of facts which requires
the further taking of evidence.
01

The drcision of the Fountain case is in no way
11 c" 1sistent with the opinion of this court and enri~·('l:· suppo;·ts that opinion. The facts necessary
:i:r the gi·antillg of a summa1·y judgment were betore the t1·i::d court and the issues involving the
Lri;:il court's ruling we1·e fully before the Supreme
1

1

Court and the opm10n of this court tl'eats that
matter and properly excluded from the opinion ,
great many irrelevant matters attempted to be rais~
ed by the defendant appellants.
POINT II.
THE COURT IN ITS OPINION CORRECTLY DJs.
REGARDED A NUMBER OF THE ARGUMENTS PRE.
SENTED BY THE APPELLANT BECAUSE THESE
ARGUMENTS WERE TOTALLY WITHOUT MERIT
AND THERE WAS NO OCCASION FOR THE COllRT
TO TREAT THESE ARGUMENTS IN ITS OPINIO\

The defendant appellants in their petition fnr
rehearing complain that the court ignored many of
its legal arguments and did not treat the same in
the opinion. No authority is cited for the prnposition that this deprives the defendant appellant of
any basic rights and it is submitted that if each of
these arguments was treated the opinion would br
voluminous and the treatment would add nothing
to the body of law since the law applicable to i;10st
of these arguments is very clear.
As an example of the type of argument which
the petitioner desired the court to examine, the peti
tioner claims that the corporation is estopped undP:
Utah law from accepting the services of the defend
ants and not paying for the same. This argumen1
is most remarkable in view of the undisputed fact
that the defendant appellants specifically agrreri
with the corporation, its stockholders and the goi·
erning administrative bureaus regulating the .
of securities that they would not receive any salaric'
6

until the mining operations of the company were on
a paying basis. In o~her words, .they agreed. to serve
thr company gi·atmtously until the profits from
the mining operations would justify a meeting of the
board of <lirectorn to vote salaries to executive personnel. The undisputed facts are that the two defendants met and voted salaries at a time when the
company had no income and subsequently paid those
salaries from the proceeds of the sale of the corporate assets. There cannot be an estoppel since the
defendants agreed to serve the corporation without
pay and the corporation, therefore, did not receive
~my unjust enrichment. It simply received the services which were agreed to be rendered to it without
the corporation incuring any obligation therefor.
The fact that the defendants agreed to serve the
corpo:·ation \vithout compensation is not remarkable
since they owned 90 ~,,~ of the corporate stock themselres. Any increase in the value of the equity
would largely inure to their benefit. Since there was
~bso:utely no merit to the argument of estoppel
there was no occasion for the court to treat it in
the opinion and to fail to comment on this argument depriYes the defendants of no substantial
'·~;hts. The oplnion ably dis~~osed of a good many
'.:r1/ar arguncnts haviilg no legal merit when it
1e 1:n2c1 to i1wolve itself in a detailed dis::ussion of
0

1 hc,se

arguments.

The petitione1· for rehearing reiterates the argulil('i1L it made in its brief that the sale of the corpor7

ate assets did constitute a profit from the minin
operations within the meaning of the agreernent anJ
that, therefore, the defendant appellants were ju8tified in paying themselves from the proceeds. 1'ht
petitioner overlooks, however, the very importan!
fact that the salaries paid were voted and accrueu
prior to any sale of the corporate assets and, there.
fore, even if their interpretation of the meaning
of the language of the registration statement an;]
offering circular was correct the very earliest dal1"
that the defendants could call a meeting to vote
salaries for themselves would be after the sale of
the corporate assets and under no construction uf
the language of the agreement could the defendant,
pay themselves for past services rendered at a time
when the corporation had no revenues whatsoever
from operations.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the opinion 01
the court was sound and in accordance with la11
and that the defendant appellants have not been de·
prived of any rights which they may have to ~·1
adjudication of the cause of action ruled upon b'
the trial court and the Supreme Court of the Statt
of Utah.
Respectfully submitted,
GORDON I. HYDE
555 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
,
Plaintiffs u.nd Respo11dc11i.:
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